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DEPENDENT ON THE JURY: ANTICIPATION AND OBVIOUSNESS
OF DEPENDENT PATENT CLAIMS AND IRRECONCILABLE JURY
VERDICTS
PATRICK BICKLEY
While Schridinger's cat may be both alive and dead at any given mo-
ment, even in theory, claim limitations cannot be concurrently both met
and not met.'
INTRODUCTION
As the sole appellate court for cases arising under the patent laws,2 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has the responsibility for review-
ing jury verdicts in patent trials. Juries often must determine the validity of
the independent and dependent claims at issue in the suit. Due to the nature
of these claims, a dependent claim cannot be invalid because of anticipa-
tion or obviousness unless the independent claim from which it depends
was also invalid. A jury verdict finding an independent claim valid but a
related dependent claim either anticipated or obvious is irreconcilable.4
However, the Federal Circuit has used the inconsistencies between regional
circuits on the issue of jury verdicts to reach different outcomes in similar
cases based solely on the region in which the patent case originated.'
This note examines the cases in which the Federal Circuit has dealt
with irreconcilable jury verdicts based on independent and dependent
claims. First, in Section I, this note discusses the problem of irreconcilable
verdicts based on independent and dependent claims. Second, in Section II,
this note examines the different approaches of the regional circuits to the
question of irreconcilable jury verdicts and how the Federal Circuit has
1. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a).
3. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("A broader
independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent
claim is invalid for obviousness.") (citing Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)). Other issues of invalidity, such as failure to provide a written description, failure to enable
one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention, or failure to disclose best mode under 35
U.S.C. § 112, present different questions when dealing with independent and dependent claims. As
such, they are beyond the scope of this note.
4. See Callaway Golf 576 F.3d at 1344.
5. Compare id. with L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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applied these approaches in cases with conflicting independent and depen-
dent verdicts. Finally, in Section III, this note proposes and discusses po-
tential solutions, including the current approaches by the district courts in
correcting conflicting verdicts, a proposal to adopt explicit language deal-
ing with the problem in model jury instructions, and an approach under the
Federal Circuit's rule of deference for dealing with the problem.
I. IRRECONCILABLE JURY VERDICTS BASED ON INDEPENDENT AND
DEPENDENT CLAIMS
Juries play an important role in patent litigation. Patent holders have
increasingly sought juries in litigation.' Studies published in 2000 by Kim-
berly Moore showed that juries were more likely than judges to find for
patent holders.' However, the complexity of the technical and scientific
facts that often underlie the patent at issue has led to numerous proposals to
reform the patent jury system, including suggestions for a pool of techni-
cally competent jurors,' the creation of specialized trial courts or juries for
patent cases,9 or giving the U.S. Court of International Trade jurisdiction
over patent litigation.o The jury often determines whether the patent is
valid, whether the patent covers the accused product or process, and wheth-
er the patent is enforceable. These three main categories of defenses can
generally be thought of as invalidity - what I do is not covered by the pa-
tent, non-infringement - what I do is not covered by the patent, and unen-
forceability - your bad behavior in obtaining the patent negates your patent
rights."
Additionally, the number and types of claims at issue further compli-
cate patent litigation. Patent cases often involve multiple claims contained
in multiple patents. Some of these claims may be self-contained, called
independent claims. Other claims may be dependent upon these indepen-
6. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 366 (2000).
7. Id. at 386 (finding patent holders more likely to prevail with a jury, 68 percent, than a judge,
51 percent).
8. Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
49 (1997); Davin M. Stockwell, Note, A Jury of One's (Technically Competent) Peers? 21 WHiITrIER L.
REv. 645, 686-90 (2000).
9. Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement
Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 623, 672 (1996).
10. John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction
Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 67, 114-15 (1995).
I1. Because inequitable conduct will render the entire patent unenforceable (see Kingsdown Med.
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)), and not simply the individual
claims, there is no independent/dependent confusion issue for inequitable conduct.
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dent claims, called dependent claims. A necessary result of a claim depen-
dent on an independent claim is that it incorporates all of the limitations of
any independent claim from which it depends.12 A dependent claim will
thus be narrower, or cover less subject matter, than any independent claim
from which it depends because of the additional limitations."
As a result, it is possible to infringe the broader independent claim
while not infringing the narrower dependent claim.14 For example, consider
an independent claim, Claim 1, claiming a pencil comprising two elements,
a wooden shaft and a graphite core. Additionally, consider dependent
Claim 2, which claims the invention of Claim 1, with the additional limita-
tion that the wooden shaft is yellow in color. Claim 2 contains all of the
limitations of Claim 1, that the product contains both a wooden shaft and a
graphite core, but also the additional limitation that the wooden shaft be
yellow. A potential infringer may produce a competing pencil comprising a
blue painted wooden shaft and a graphite core. The infringer has infringed
Claim 1 because his product contains the wooden shaft and graphite core.
However, he has not infringed Claim 2 because the competing pencil does
not meet the additional limitation that the wooden shaft be yellow.
One can infringe an independent claim but not a dependent claim that
includes additional limitations. However, the reverse is not true. One who
infringes a dependent claim must also infringe the independent claim.
Going back to the pencil invention with Claim 1 and Claim 2, it is simply
not possible to have a pencil that reads on Claim 2-the competing pencil
has a yellow wooden shaft and graphite core-without that pencil also
reading on Claim 1-that the pencil has a wooden shaft and graphite core.
Claim 1 is infringed regardless of the color of the wooden shaft. As stated
by the Federal Circuit, "It is axiomatic that dependent claims cannot be
found infringed unless the claims from which they depend have been found
to have been infringed.""
12. 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 4 (2006) ("[A] claim in dependent form shall contain reference to a claim
previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in
dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it
refers.").
13. The Federal Circuit has indicated that "limitation" refers to claim language and "element"
refers to the accused device in litigation. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 324
F.3d 1308, 1315 n. I (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, in practice the distinction is not rigorously observed.
14. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
15. Id at 1553. But see Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677,
685 (Fed. Cir. 1990) overruled in part on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l., Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993) ("While this proposition is no doubt generally correct, it does not apply in the
circumstances of this case."). Wilson Sporting Goods is discussed in more detail, infra.
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Similar to infringement, a dependent claim cannot be invalid because
of anticipation or obviousness unless the independent claim from which it
depends was also found invalid.16 Anticipation occurs when a single prior
art reference contains each limitation claimed by the invention." To return
to the pencil example above, if another company already sold pencils com-
prising a green wooden shaft and a graphite core, Claim 1 would be antic-
ipated by the green pencils (and thus invalid) because each of the
limitations on Claim 1, that the pencil have a wooden shaft and graphite
core, can be found in the competing pencil. However, Claim 2 would not
be anticipated by the green pencil because its additional limitation, that the
wooden shaft be yellow, is not found in the prior art (in this case, the com-
peting green pencil).
Even if a single prior art reference does not contain each limitation,
the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention must be
more than obvious for the patent to be valid." If green, blue, red, purple,
and many other colors of pencils are disclosed in the prior art, it is likely
that Claim 2, a yellow colored pencil, would have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art of pencil making, and Claim 2 would not be
valid. If the narrower Claim 2, a yellow pencil, is obvious, then the broader
Claim 1, any wooden pencil, must also be obvious.
If at trial the jury concluded that Claim 2 was invalid because of either
anticipation or obviousness, then it must also conclude that Claim 1 was
invalid." Were the jury to conclude otherwise, the verdicts would be incon-
sistent with each other and could not be reconciled.
16. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
17. Anticipation by the prior art defeats the claimed invention's novelty. However, because the
U.S. is a first-to-invent country, rather than a first-to-file country, some public disclosures are allowed.
The statutory requirements for novelty are given in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
18. The statutory requirements for obviousness are given in 35 U.S.C. § 103. To determine wheth-
er a claimed invention is obvious, the court determines the scope and content of the prior art, the differ-
ences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and the level of ordinary level of skill of a person
in the art. Additionally, the court can consider objective indicia such as commercial success and long
felt but unsolved needs to determine whether an invention is obvious. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
19. Again, it is important to note that the reverse is not true. Claim 2 can still be valid even if
Claim I is anticipated or infringed. Using the pencil example, if the prior art discloses a pencil with a
wooden shaft and graphite core, Claim I would be anticipated, but unless the prior art also included the
limitation that the shaft be yellow, Claim 2 would not be anticipated. Likewise, if Claim I was obvious
in light of the prior art-say for example, due to shafts made of paper, steel, cloth, and clay, (which just
all happen to be unpainted because no one had ever thought of coloring the exterior of a pencil)-the
addition of the yellow covering limitation may be enough to render Claim 2 nonobvious.
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II. INVALIDITY AND IRRECONCILABLE JURY VERDICTS IN THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
The courts, however, have accepted irreconcilable verdicts from ju-
ries. Although the statutes relating to independent and dependent claims are
specific to patent laws, and thus specific to the Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has relied on the procedural rules of each
circuit in determining whether the parties had preserved the issue for re-
view on appeal. The inconsistencies between regional circuits on irrecon-
cilable jury verdicts have led to different outcomes at the Federal Circuit in
similar cases.
A. The Federal Circuit's Rule ofDeference on Procedural
Interpretations
The Federal Circuit occupies a unique place among federal circuit
courts because its jurisdiction is defined by subject matter rather than geo-
graphy.20 The Federal Circuit hears appeals from all regional circuits, and
the court often has to decide when to defer to the regional circuit's interpre-
tation of Federal law, and when it will apply its own interpretation. 2 1
Beginning in In re International Medical Prosthetics Research Asso-
ciates, the Federal Circuit gave deference to regional circuit rules when
interpreting procedural rules. 22 The Federal Court stated:
Dealing daily with such procedural questions in all types of cases, a dis-
trict court cannot and should not be asked to answer them one way when
the appeal on the merits will go to the regional circuit in which the dis-
trict court is located and in a different way when the appeal will come to
this circuit. That potential problem is obviated, however, when this court
applies the same guidance previously made available by the circuit. . .
having authority over the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1294.23
This concern over the district court being forced to "serve[] two mas-
ters or that it should [look], Janus-like, in two directions"24 has led the Fed-
20. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1294 and 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Although the Federal Circuit is often
thought of solely in patent terms, it is important to note that it also hears appeals from the U.S. Court of
Claims, the U.S. Court of International Trade, and the Merit System Promotion Board, among others.
See, generally, Adam E. Miller, The Choice of Law Rules and the Use of Precedent in the Federal
Circuit: A Unique and Evolving System, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 301, 304-11 (2007). For the pur-
poses of this note, however, only the court's patent jurisdiction is relevant.
21. See, generally, Peter J. Karol, Who's at the Helm? The Federal Circuit's Rule of Deference
and the Systemic Absence of Controlling Precedent in Matters of Patent Litigation Procedure, 37
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 11-17 (2009) (tracing the origins of the Federal Circuit's rule of deference).
22. In re Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., 739 F.2d 618 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 620.




eral Circuit to defer to regional circuit law "with regard to substantive legal
issues not within our exclusive subject matter jurisdiction ... when review-
ing cases arising under the patent laws." 25 The Federal Circuit has also
generally deferred to regional circuit law for interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules of the district court.26 However, the
Federal Circuit has indicated two situations in which it will not defer:
"substantive and procedural issues intimately involved in the substance of
enforcement of the patent right."" Although the question of irreconcilabili-
ty of independent and dependent claim verdicts implicates substantive
law,28 the question on appeal often hinges on whether the parties properly
preserved the question for appellate review, a question on which the Feder-
al Circuit has deferred to the regional circuit interpretation. 29 This has lead
to different results depending on the location of the district court which
decided the patent case.
B. An Example Case: Callaway v. Acushnet
In Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware had to deal with an inconsistent jury verdict.30 In Cal-
laway, the court asked the jury to determine whether certain claims of U.S.
Patent No. 6,210,293, dealing with a multi-layered golf ball, were invalid
due to obviousness." Among the claims the defendant challenged as ob-
vious were Claim 4, an independent claim, and Claim 5, a dependent claim
based on independent Claim 4.32 Because neither party requested a special
verdict form under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the jury returned
only a multi-part general verdict form with no written findings for each
issue of fact.34 The verdict form, with the jury's responses marked as an
"X", was as follows:
25. Id at 858.
26. Id. at 857 (citing Beckman Instrs., Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1989) and Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
27. Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
28. See Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
29. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The issue
of inconsistent verdicts is a procedural issue that is not unique to patent law. The Federal Circuit applies
the law of the regional circuit . .. to the issue of inconsistent verdicts.").
30. Callaway Golf Co., v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 614 (D. Del. 2008), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
31. Id at 615.
32. Id at 605-06.
33. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
34. Callaway Golf 585 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
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1. Has Acushnet proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of
the following claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,210,293 (the '293 patent) is
invalid due to obviousness?
"Yes" is afinding for Acushnet. "No" is afinding for Callaway.
(A) Claim 1 Yes No X
(B) Claim 4 Yes No X
(C) Claim 5 Yes X No35
Thus, the jury found that independent Claim 4 was not obvious, and
therefore valid, but dependent Claim 5 was obvious, and therefore invalid.
In other words, the jury indicated it believed that the broader claim was not
obvious, but the narrower claim was obvious.
Neither the court nor the parties had explained to the jury that a de-
pendant claim cannot be invalid if the claim on which it depends is valid."
In hindsight, the district court identified two factors that led to the lack of
such an explanation. First, the parties' joint proposed verdict form con-
tained only the question of invalidity for obviousness, and no specific limi-
tations were included.37 The form only included an instruction, adopted by
the court, that each claim is a "separate statement of the patented inven-
tion" to be considered "individually."" Second, the court noted that while
the Federal Circuit Bar Association's model jury instructions provide an
instruction for dependent claims with respect to infringement, no such in-
struction exists with respect to the validity of dependent claims.
Although the district court recognized the irreconcilable nature of the
jury verdict, it allowed the verdicts to stand.40 The court noted that under
Third Circuit law, "inconsistency, alone, is insufficient to warrant a new
trial absent an affect on [the] defendant's substantial rights."41 Citing the
seven days of trial following "nearly two years of the parties' preparation
and expense,' the fact that the defendant had "stipulated that it infringes
each of the Sullivan patents; three of which were held valid by the jury
without reservation,' and because "almost as often as not, the Federal




39. Id. at 615 n.17. The Federal Circuit Bar Association's model jury instructions are further
discussed in Part III, infra.
40. Id. at 617 ("[T]he court will allow the verdict to stand and the appeal to go forward without
further delay. Put another way, the court declines to allow the defendant another bite at the apple absent
more compelling circumstances.").
41. Id. at 616-17 (citing Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991)).




Circuit may reverse or remand any of the underpinnings upon which trial in
the matter proceeded,"" the court entered judgment on the verdicts.4 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Acushnet that the jury ver-
dicts represented irreconcilable verdicts.46 The Court found that both parties
had preserved their objection to the inconsistency.47 Because Third Circuit
law required a new trial where the verdicts could not be reconciled, the
Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for
a new trial on obviousness.4 8
C. Situations in Which the Federal Circuit Has Upheld Irreconcilable
Verdicts
1. The Issue of Waiver
The Federal Circuit encountered procedural facts similar to those in
Callaway in Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., in which the court
had to apply the law of the Sixth Circuit.4 9 In Bradford, the claims of U.S.
Patent No. 4,966,280, dealing with an anti-static container, were at issue.o
Claim 11 was an independent claim, and Claims 12 and 17 were dependent
on Claim 11.s1 The jury, using special interrogatories submitted with the
general verdict, found independent Claim 11 to be valid, but dependent
Claims 12 and 17 to be invalid as both anticipated and obvious.52 In other
words, according to the jury, the broader Claim 11 was novel, but the nar-
rower Claims 12 and 17, which included all of limitations of Claim 11 plus
additional limitations, had been found in the prior art. Neither Bradford, the
patent holder, nor Jefferson Smurfit Corp. ("JSC"), the accused infringer,
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("A broader inde-
pendent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim is invalid for obviousness.").
47. Id. at 1343.
48. Id. at 1344-45 ("Under Third Circuit law, in a case where a reading of the verdicts that would
solve the apparent inconsistency proves impossible and the evidence might support either of the two
inconsistent verdicts, 'the appropriate remedy is ordinarily, not simply to accept one verdict and dismiss
the other, but to order an entirely new trial."' (quoting Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 90 (3d Cir.
1996)). Faced again with irreconcilable verdicts on the question of obviousness in Comaper Corp. v.
Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1349-1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit reiterated that the broader
independent claim cannot be nonobvious when a dependent claim stemming from it is obvious. Be-
cause the evidence could have supported either verdict, the Federal Circuit remanded for a new trial in
accordance with Third Circuit law. Id at 1354-55.




52. Id at *2.
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immediately objected to the inconsistency, although the court gave both
parties the opportunity to address "anything else" before it dismissed the
jury." Following the dismissal, JSC moved for judgment as a matter of law
or for a new trial asserting, among other reasons, the inconsistencies be-
tween the special interrogatories and general verdict.5 4 The district court
denied the motion because JSC had failed to object to the inconsistencies
before the jury was discharged, as was required under Sixth Circuit law."s
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding
that JSC had waived its right to object under Sixth Circuit law." The Fed-
eral Circuit found the procedural facts of the case to be very similar to Ten-
nessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers," in which "the
[trial judge] inquired: 'Is there anything further that any counsel wishes to
raise before the Court excuses the jury in this case?' Counsel for both par-
ties replied negatively and the jury was discharged."" The Sixth Circuit
concluded that both parties in Tennessee Consolidated had waived the issue
of verdict inconsistency by failing to object at this point." The Federal
Circuit compared this sequence to what had happened at the district court
level in Bradford:
"[A]fter the jury returned its verdict . .. the parties were afforded an op-
portunity to object to the verdict. Neither did so. The Court also inquired
whether the parties had anything else to bring before the Court at that
time. Again, [JSC did not raise] the issue of an inconsistent verdict. "6
The Federal Circuit enforced the same stringent interpretation of the
Sixth Circuit waiver rule in L& W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., even though the
parties had only limited time to review the verdicts before the jury was
dismissed. In L&W, the jury returned a special verdict including a finding
that independent Claim 7 was valid, but dependent Claim 10, which was
based on Claim 7, was invalid.62 The return of the jury's verdict, the poll of
the jury, and the court's discharge of the jury, all occurred within six mi-
nutes, during which neither party apparently noticed or objected to the in-




56. Id. at *4.
57. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969).
58. Bradford, 2001 WL 35738792, at *4 (quoting Tennessee Consol. Coal, 416 F.2d at 1200).
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting district court decision) (emphasis in original).
61. L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
62. Id at 1318.
63. Id. at 1319.
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the inconsistencies in the verdicts, but the district court held that both had
waived their objections as to inconsistency because they failed to object
before the discharge of the jury.' This was in spite of the fact that the jury
verdict included findings on all ten claims of the patent including two inde-
pendent claims (Claim I and Claim 7) and eight dependent claims (Claims
2-6 dependent on Claim 1 and Claims 8-10 dependent on Claim 7).6 The
Federal Circuit applied the waiver rule of the Sixth Circuit and agreed with
the district court that the parties had waived their right to object to the in-
consistencies. The Federal Circuit noted that the very use of a special
verdict procedure "should alert lawyers to the possibility that the jury's
responses might be inconsistent." 6 7
Similarly, in Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Intern., Inc., the Federal Cir-
cuit noted that under Seventh Circuit law, there is an obligation upon coun-
sel to seek return of the jury when the interrogatory answers are
inconsistent with each other and the general verdict is inconsistent with at
least some of the interrogatory answers. Quoting the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Strauss v. Stratojac Corp., the Federal Circuit explained the
purpose behind the waiver rule:
If counsel who had submitted the questions saw no inconsistency and
raised no objection to the discharge of the jury, we can, at least under the
circumstances of this case, see no reason why he should be permitted to
try his luck with a second jury. Proper respect for the jury verdict and for
the court's responsibility to manage its caseload fairly and expeditiously
militate against such a course.69
Although the Federal Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to deter-
mine whether the rule applies to each circuit, other circuits also apply some
form of the waiver rule. The Federal Circuit would likely apply the same
rule to a case originating in the Second Circuit as it does to cases arising in
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In Lavoie v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., the
Second Circuit held that a party waived the issue of inconsistent verdicts
when that party failed to object prior to the discharge of the jury.70 The
64. Id.
65. U.S. Patent No. 5,670,264, col. 8 1. 51-col 10 1. 20 (filed Sept. 5, 1995).
66. L & W, 471 F.3d at 1319.
67. Id. (citing Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981)).
68. 839 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Strauss v. Stratojac Corp., 810 F.2d 679, 683 (7th
Cir. 1987)). The allegedly inconsistent verdicts in Allen Organ were not of the independent/dependent
type, but instead involved the on-sale bar and obviousness questions. The Federal Circuit held that the
verdicts could be reconciled. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Strauss, 810 F.2d at 683).
70. Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1992).
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First,71 Third,72 Fifth, 73 Eighth,74 Eleventh,75 and D.C." Circuits have all
advocated at least some form of the waiver rule.
If the Sixth Circuit's waiver rule is the most stringent, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's seems to be the most lenient. The Fourth Circuit, in Figg v. Schroed-
er, concluded that a party did not waive its objection to inconsistent
verdicts by failing to move to resubmit the findings to the jury for reconsi-
deration. 77 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit cast the conflict as a constitu-
tional question, quoting an earlier case for the proposition that "the legal
error resulting from entry of a judgment based on inconsistent special inter-
rogatories may be an error of constitutional magnitude, infringing the se-
venth amendment right to jury trial by allowing the District Court to usurp
the jury's function."7M Thus, the Federal Circuit, in adherence to its rule of
deference, would automatically order a new trial for irreconcilable verdicts
when applying Fourth Circuit law.7 9
Somewhere between the Sixth Circuit's approach of absolute waiver
after the dismissal of the jury and the Fourth Circuit's approach of never
waiving the inconsistency lies an intermediate approach. In Arachnid, Inc.
v. Medalist Marketing Corp., the Federal Circuit discussed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach to allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts, although it ultimate-
71. Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2002) (party forfeited right to
object to alleged inconsistency by failing to object prior to jury's discharge despite "truncated ten-
minute session" in which jury verdict was returned).
72. See Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 312 n.21 (3d Cir. 2007) (inconsistency in
general verdict accompanied by interrogatories waived if not objected to prior to discharge of jury, but
no waiver for failure to object to special verdicts).
73. Mercer v. Long Mfg. N. C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 947-48 n.I (5th Cir. 1982) (waiver for failure
to object to general verdict, but no waiver for failure to object to special interrogatories).
74. Ludwig v. Marion Labs., 465 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir. 1972) (waiver when fail to object prior
to discharge ofjury).
75. Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (failure to object to
inconsistency when announced by jury constitutes waiver).
76. Machesney v. Larry Bruni, M.D., P.C., 905 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 n.15 (D.D.C. 1995) (preser-
vation ofjudicial resources by sending the case back to the jury rather than ordering a new trial).
77. Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 643 (4th Cir. 2002).
78. Id. (quoting Ladnier v. Murray, 769 F.2d 195, 198 n.3 (4th Cir.1985)).
79. The Tenth Circuit has adopted a plain error exception to its general rule that a party waives the
right to object to inconsistencies. See Johnson v. ABLT Trucking Co., Inc., 412 F.3d 1138, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2005). Applying this analysis, the Federal Circuit would likely find no post-verdict motion was
needed in the case of irreconcilable independent and dependent verdicts. Interestingly, the appellant in
L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc. argued that the Federal Circuit should adopt a "plain error" exception to
the waiver rule in the case of irreconcilable verdicts, but the court responded that the Sixth Circuit had
not recognized such a rule and that it was unlikely to do so. The Federal Circuit does not appear to have
considered adopting a plain error rule as part of its own body of law. See L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
471 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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ly found that the verdicts could be reconciled.o Under Ninth Circuit law, a
party does not need to challenge the consistency of the verdict prior to the
dismissal of the jury, but can make the challenge for the first time in a post-
trial motion.8' If, however, there is no post-trial motion, appellate review is
very limited, and the parties cannot raise a challenge to verdict consistency
for the first time on appeal.82
Thus, the Federal Circuit's willingness to consider an inconsistent
verdict varies based on the regional circuit in which the case originated. In
appeals from most district courts in most circuits, if a party has not recog-
nized and objected to the inconsistencies before the discharge of jury, the
Federal Circuit will conclude that the party has waived its right to contest
the inconsistency of the jury verdict. The Federal Circuit will apply this
rule even where the time given the parties to review the verdict may be as
83little as six minutes. If, however, the case originates in a district court
located in either the Fourth or Tenth Circuit, the Federal Circuit will con-
clude that a party who has not raised the issue of inconsistency at trial, or
even in post-trial motions, has not waived the issue of inconsistent verdicts,
and the Federal Circuit will vacate the judgment if the verdicts are indeed
inconsistent. 84 If the case arises in a district court located in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the party does not need to raise the issue before the discharge of the
jury, but must raise it at some point in post-trial motions for the Federal
Circuit to conclude that the party did not waive the right to appeal the in-
consistency in the jury verdicts." As a result, the Federal Circuit will allow
inconsistent verdicts to stand in some cases where the party has failed to
object prior to the discharge of the jury, but not others.
2. An Exception Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
The case of Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Asso-
ciates presented a very narrow set of circumstances under the doctrine of
equivalents in which the Federal Circuit indicated it might uphold seeming-
ly inconsistent verdicts of independent and dependent claims. Although
80. Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Arachnid dealt
with allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts between a state consumer protection law and a trade dress
claim. The court found that these verdicts could be reconciled.
81. Id. (citing L.A. Nut House v. Holiday Hardware Corp., 825 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1987)).
82. Id
83. See L & W, 471 F.3d at 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
84. See Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 643 (4th Cir. 2002) and Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1141.
85. See Arachnid, 972 F.2d at 1304 (citing L.A. Nut House, 825 F.2d at 1356).
86. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Although the court did not find the claims at issue to fall within this exception, it did note the possibility
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the court ultimately determined that the accused products at issue did not
infringe the claims either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, it
did indicate that it might be possible under the doctrine of equivalents to
infringe the dependent claims without infringing the independent claims."
Under the doctrine of equivalents, "a product or process that does not
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless
be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the
accused products or process and the claimed elements of the patented in-
vention."" The purpose of this doctrine is to protect the patent holder from
unscrupulous competitors who could make "unimportant and insubstantial
changes and substitutions" that would not change the operation of the in-
vention, but would remove it from the literal language of the claims." Un-
der the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may occur if the accused
product "performs substantially the same overall function or works in sub-
stantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall result as
the claimed invention."90 However, the doctrine of equivalents cannot be
used where the asserted scope of equivalency encompasses the prior art?
This is because the patent holder cannot use the doctrine to cover subject
matter she could not have obtained from the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") through literal claims.92
In Wilson Sporting Goods, the plaintiff claimed infringement of inde-
pendent Claim I and several dependent claims of U.S. Patent No.
4,560,168, dealing with the pattern of dimples on a golf ball.93 The patent
described a method for creating a more symmetrical distribution of dimples
on the golf ball, with the shape and the width of the dimples being mostly
immaterial.9 4 To describe the location of the dimples, the patent described
the ball in terms of six circles and twenty triangles, and specified that the
dimples were arranged as to not intersect the sides of the circles or trian-
gles.95 The remaining claims were all dependent on Claim 1, and each fur-
of an exception under the doctrine of equivalents. However, for reasons discussed infra, claims meeting
the exception would not actually be irreconcilable.
87. See id. at 685-86.
88. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 22 (1997) (citing Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)).
89. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
90. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 683 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 684.
93. Id. at 679.
94. Id
95. Id. at 680.
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ther limited the number and location of dimples with respect to the circles
and triangles.96
The location of the dimples was critical in the litigation. The closest
prior art to Wilson's patent was manufactured by Uniroyal. The Uniroyal
ball, when viewed in terms of the circles and triangles, had thirty or more
dimples intersecting the circles by twelve to fifteen thousandths of an
inch.97 The allegedly infringing balls, made by Dunlop and Slazenger" had
dimples slightly intersecting the circles, the intersection ranging between
four and nine thousandths of an inch.99 This meant that the allegedly in-
fringing balls could not literally infringe the claims of Wilson's patent,
which required no overlap between the dimples and circles. However, Wil-
son argued for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and the jury
agreed. 100
Uniroyal Wilson Patent Dunlop and Slazen-
(Prior Art) ger (Allegedly In-
fringing)
Intersection 0.012-0.015 None 0.004-0.009
(inch)
Table 1: Summary of Products in Wilson Sporting Goods Co.
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the jury's finding of infringe-
ment on Claim 1.L' Using a "hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope
to literally cover the accused product," the Federal Circuit found that any
hypothetical claim covering both Claiml and the accused products would
have been obvious in light of the Uniroyal prior art.'02 in other words, had
Wilson sought to claim dimples not intersecting the circles and triangles
through dimples intersecting the circles up to nine thousandths of an inch,
the claim would have been rejected as obvious in light of the Uniroyal prior
art. Therefore, the Dunlop and Slazenger balls did not infringe Claim 1
under the doctrine of equivalents.
Even though the Federal Circuit had found the independent claim was
infringed, it went on to determine whether the dependent claims had been
infringed. The court distinguished the case from cases involving literal
96. Id.
97. Id. at 680-81.
98. David Geoffrey & Assoc. does business as Slazenger. Id at 677.
99. Id at 681.
100. Id at 678.
101. Id. at 685.
102. Id at 684-85.
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infringement.103 in cases of literal infringement, the claims do not involve
potentially equivalent prior art." However, in cases of infringement by the
doctrine of equivalents, the prior art may not lead to the same result with
the dependent claims.'o But, in Wilson Sporting Goods, the Federal Circuit
considered each dependent claim and concluded that, "none could be given
a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass [the allegedly infringing
balls] because that would extend Wilson's patent protection beyond the
hypothetical claims it could lawfully have obtained from the PTO."'"
Thus, the Dunlop and Salzenger balls did not infringe Wilson's indepen-
dent or dependent claims.
Using this analysis, however, a jury or court could determine that de-
pendent claims are infringed under the doctrine of equivalents even when
the independent claim on which they are based is not.' For example, im-
agine the prior art included pencils consisting of a wooden shaft and gra-
phite core where the wooden shaft was at least seven inches long, and none
of the pencils were painted. Next consider two patent claims: Claim I on a
pencil comprising a wooden shaft between six and six and one half inches
in length and a graphite core; Claim 2 comprising the pencil of Claim I
with the additional limitation that the wooden shaft is yellow. Finally, con-
sider an allegedly infringing pencil comprising a wooden shaft six and
three quarters inches in length, painted yellow, with a graphite core.
Element Prior Art Patent Patent Claim Alleged In-
Claim 1 2 fringer
Graphite Yes Yes Yes Yes
Core:
Wooden 7" and 6-6.5" 6-6.5" 6.75"
Shaft: longer
Color: None - Yellow Yellow
Table 2: Summary of Products in Pencil Example
First, the alleged infringer does not literally infringe either Claim 1 or
Claim 2. Next, the alleged infringer does not infringe Claim 1 under the
doctrine of equivalents because the prior art limits the reach of the equiva-
lents allowed under Claim 1. However, the prior art cannot be asserted
against Claim 2 to limit the scope of the doctrine of equivalents. This is




107. See id at 685-86.
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because the prior art does not have the additional limitation of Claim 2, that
the shaft be yellow. Because the equivalents of Claim 2 are not limited by
the prior art, it is possible that the accused device infringes Claim 2, the
dependent claim, under the doctrine of equivalents, even though it would
not infringe Claim 1, the independent claim."os
3. Other Circumstances
Apart from the issue of waiver and doctrine of equivalents, the Federal
Circuit has upheld or indicated it would uphold irreconcilable jury verdicts
in several other situations. In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
Chemque, the Federal Circuit applied Fifth Circuit law and held that if
defendants argue to a district court that a verdict is reconcilable, then the
party would be estopped from asserting that the verdicts are irreconcilable
on appeal.'09 In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing ("3M'), the jury
returned a special verdict, in which it had found independent Claim 1 not
infringed, but dependent Claim 9 infringed.o 3M raised the issue of irre-
concilability to the district court and moved for a new trial. "' Chemque
opposed this motion, arguing that the verdicts were not inconsistent.112 The
district court ultimately agreed with Chemque and denied 3M's motion for
a new trial." 3 3M did not appeal this ruling, but Chemque appealed the
jury's findings with respect to Claim 9.114 The Federal Circuit held that
Chemque was judicially estopped from raising the inconsistency issue be-
cause, "not only did [Chemque] not raise this inconsistency before the dis-
trict court, they expressly argued against a finding of inconsistency.""s
Therefore, the Federal Circuit reviewed the case "under the premise that
the verdict is reconcilable," and refused to consider the substantive issue of
irreconcilability.
The Federal Circuit has also indicated in dicta that it would uphold
under Third Circuit law an irreconcilable verdict where the "verdict ap-
108. Such a situation could therefore give an independent claim that was not infringed while the
dependent claim was found to be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. However, because of the
prior art limitations, these verdicts are not actually irreconcilable.
109. 303 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
110. Id. at 1299.
111. Id.
112. Id. (Defendants stated "This is not a situation in which the jury's findings on essential issues
are 'in irreconcilable conflict,' such as might be the case where a jury finds, on the basis of a single
factual allegation that a particular proposition is 'true' and, at the same time, that its corollary is 'not
true."').
113. Id. at 1300.
114. Id. at 1298.
115. Id. at 1302.
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pears to be the result of compromise [by the parties] as opposed to jury
confusion."' 16 In these situations, policy concerns of enforcing the com-
promise agreed to by the parties support the legal fiction that such claims
could be reconciled.
III. SOLUTIONS
As the cases already discussed have shown, despite clear instructions
from the Federal Circuit that a dependent claim cannot be infringed or
invalid as anticipated or obvious unless the independent claim on which it
is based is also found infringed or invalid, irreconcilable verdicts are re-
turned by juries and upheld by courts. Parties have lost their opportunity to
object to the inconsistencies by not realizing the inconsistencies until it is
too late under the specific procedural rules of the circuit.
These problems must be placed in the context of the complexity of pa-
tent litigation."' For example, consider the complex series of jury verdicts
at issue in Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc.."' The plaintiff,
Wahpeton Canvas, had sued two defendants, Frontier, Inc. and Agri Cover
for infringement of its patent on roll-up truck bed covers." 9 The Federal
Circuit provided the following description of the case:
The present is another appeal following a trial process plagued with a
plethora of pusillanimous presentations. Thirty claims were asserted
against one defendant's product and 29 against the other differing prod-
uct; two claims against only the first; one claim against only the second;
and one claim against neither.' 20
The jury returned a verdict by checking "yes" or "no" alongside a se-
ries of questions dealing with infringement for each claim number, but the
questions did not identify each claim as either independent or dependent.' 2 '
The jury was "properly instructed that a dependent claim includes all the
limitations of the claim from which it depends." 2 2 The Federal Circuit
summarized the jury's responses:
(1) Agri Cover had not infringed [independent] claims 1 or 11;
116. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1345 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("There is no
contention that the verdict here could plausibly be considered such a compromise.").
117. Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 HoUS. L. REV. 779,
784 n.27 (2002) Professor Moore cites a National Academies Committee report that the Administrative
Office of the Courts considers patent cases 1.7 times more complex than the average civil case.
118. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 1547-48.
120. Id. at 1551.
121. Id. at 1547.
122. Id. at 1553.
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(2) Agri Cover had not infringed [dependent] claims 2-4, 6, 9, 10, 12,
13, 16-19, 22-25, or 27-31;
(3) it could not answer on whether Agri Cover had infringed [inde-
pendent] claims 14 or 21;
(4) it could not answer on whether Agri Cover had infringed [depen-
dent] claims 7, 15, 20, 26, or 32. ...
Following the trial, Wahpeton moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for infringement and for judgment that Agri Cover and Frontier
infringed on the claims that the jury did not decide. Agri Cover and Fron-
tier filed motions for judgment that they had not infringed the claims that
the jury did not decide.124 The district court granted the motions of Agri
Cover and Frontier, and Wahpeton appealed, alleging "jury confusion."l 25
The Federal Circuit attempted to salvage any "good part of [the] tri-
al."1 26 The Federal Circuit affirmed as to Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-13, and 22-32
and remanded for a new trial on infringement for Claims 14, 15, 20, and
21.127 This included the two independent claims on which the jury had not
decided, 14 and 21, as well as the claims dependent on these claims that the
jury had not answered, 15 and 20. Additionally, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's judgment of no infringement for dependent Claims
7, 26, and 32, that the jury had not answered, but which were dependent on
claims that the jury had found no infringement on.128 In other words, the
Federal Circuit affirmed those results for which the jury had found no in-
fringement of the independent claims and all of the dependent claims based
on those independent claims, regardless of how the jury answered on the
independent claims. Then, the Federal Circuit remanded for a decision on
the independent claims that the jury had not answered on, as well as the
dependent claims based on these independent claims. All of these results
are consistent with the Federal Circuit's view that "It is axiomatic that de-
pendent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims from which
they depend have been found to have been infringed ... .."
123. Id. at 1547 (bracketed insertions in original). The same jury also found that (5) Frontier had
not infringed three independent claims, (6) Frontier had not infringed twenty dependent claims, (7) it
could not answer on whether Frontier infringed one claim (8) the patent was not inequitably procured,
(9) Claims 1-4, 6-13, and 15-32 were not invalid, and (10) it could not answer on whether Claim 14
was not invalid. A separate trial on Frontier's counterclaims immediately following the infringement
trial. However, only the claims against Agri Cover will be considered here.
124. Id. at 1548.
125. Id. at 1548, 1553.
126. Id. at 1551.
127. Id. at 1556.
128. Id. at 1552-53.
129. Id. at 1553.
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Several options exist for correcting the problem of irreconcilable jury
verdicts. First, the district courts have the opportunity to correct irreconcil-
able jury verdicts through the use of special and general interrogatories.
Second, model jury instructions for invalidity of independent and depen-
dent claims, similar to those already in place for infringement, should be
adopted. Finally, the Federal Circuit could chose to view irreconcilable
verdicts on independent and dependent claims as an issue unique to patent
law and not defer to regional circuit procedural rules.
A. District Courts' Opportunity to Correct Through Rule 49(b)
First, the district courts have the opportunity to correct any irreconcil-
able jury verdicts through the use of special and general interrogatories.
Currently, if a jury does return an irreconcilable verdict, and either the
court or one of the parties realizes the inconsistency, the court has the op-
portunity to correct the verdict through the use of Rule 49(b)."o In relevant
part, Rule 49(b) provides:
When the answers [to special interrogatories] are consistent with each
other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court
may: (A) approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment ac-
cording to the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict; (B) direct
the jury to further consider its answers and verdict; or (C) order a new
trial.
As with the issue of waiver, the Federal Circuit defers to the rules of
the regional circuits in determining to when a court may use each option.132
The issue of inconsistent jury verdicts under Seventh Circuit rules occurred
in Intermatic, Inc. v. The Lamson & Sessions Co.." The jury had found
independent Claim 1 to be valid, but dependent Claims 6, 9, and 11 to be
invalid due to obviousness.'34 In other words, a person having ordinary skill
in the art would have thought that Claim I was not obvious, but that by
further narrowing the claim it was obvious. Both Intermatic and Lamson
moved for a judgment as a matter of law based on the inconsistent ob-
viousness verdict.' 5 Rather than order a new trial, the court decided to
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
131. Id
132. For an examination of the issues surrounding the problems with resubmitting inconsistent
findings back to the jury, see Donald Olander, Resolving Inconsistencies in Federal Special Verdicts, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 1089 (1985).
133. 273 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vac'don other grounds, 537 U.S. 1016 (2002).
134. Id. at 1368.
135. Id. at 1362.
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grant Intermatic's motion based on the jury's responses to other special
interrogatories.136
Before the Federal Circuit, Lamson argued that under Seventh Circuit
law it was entitled to a new trial because the verdicts were inconsistent.3
Additionally, Lamson pointed to the fact that the jury had "scribbled-out
and changed 'yes' answers" in the special interrogatory questions as evi-
dence that the jury was confused.'38 Intermatic responded that the changed
answers showed that the jury had carefully deliberated its answers.'39 in-
termatic argued the district court was correct in using the jury's answers to
the special interrogatories to resolve the conflict in the general verdicts.140
Intermatic pointed to Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the proposition that when answers to jury interrogatories are consistent
with each other, but not with the general verdict, the court may enter judg-
ment in accordance with the answers to the interrogatories, notwithstanding
the general verdict."'
The Federal Circuit agreed that Rule 49(b) allowed the district court to
enter judgment pursuant to the jury's answers to the special interrogato-
ries. 142 The Federal Circuit determined that Seventh Circuit law only
granted that a new trial where the verdicts were "logically incompatible to
the extent that they cannot be reconciled by reference to the evidence sup-
porting them."1 43 According to the Federal Circuit, the district court had
three options, "(1) order the jury to consider its answers further; (2) order a
new trial; or (3) harmonize the verdict with the answers." Because the
jury's answers to the special interrogatories were consistent with a finding
of nonobviousness on any of the claims, the district court did not err in
resolving the conflicting jury findings and granting Intermatic's motion for
judgment as a matter of law.'"
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1368.
138. Brief for the Appellant, Intermatic Inc. v. The Lamson & Session Co., 273 F.3d 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), vac'don other grounds, 537 U.S. 1016 (2002), 2000 WL 34251323, at *19-20.
139. Id at *47.
140. Intermatic, 273 F.3d at 1368.
141. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)).
142. Id. at 1369.
143. Id. (citing Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). This seems to be the general approach of the circuits. See e.g. Mazloum v. D.C. Metro. Police
Dep't., 576 F. Supp. 2d 25, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing with approval Third Circuit law that proper to
grant new trial, not enter judgment for one side, when verdicts are "irreconcilably inconsistent").
144. Intermatic, 273 F.3d at 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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B. Adoption of a Model Jury Instruction for Invalidity
Second, the problem of irreconcilable jury verdicts with respect to in-
dependent and dependent claims could be reduced by the adoption of an
appropriate model jury instruction. As illustrated above in the Wahpeton
Canvas case, merely stating that dependent claims contain the limitations
of the independent claims on which they depend is not sufficient to give the
jury guidance in determining the validity and infringement of the related
claims. By properly instructing the jury as to the relationship between the
claims, two benefits are realized. First, including language specifically
stating that if the jury finds an independent claim is not infringed or invalid
because of anticipation or obviousness, then it must find any claims depen-
dent upon that claim not infringed or invalid will give the jury better in-
structions as to the law in this area. Such language currently exists for in-
infringement.'45 Second, including this language will alert the court and the
parties of the potential for the sort of independent/dependent irreconcilable
verdicts discussed in this note. This is especially important where the court
may quickly dismiss the jury following the return of the verdict, such as in
L & W discussed previously.
Model jury instructions of this sort are already available for indepen-
dent and dependent claim infringement. Currently, the Federal Circuit Bar
Association ("FCBA"), American Intellectual Property Law Association
("AIPLA"), and American Bar Association ("ABA") all have model jury
instructions relating to infringement of independent and dependent claims.
The FCBA's instruction explicitly states the problems associated with
independent and dependent claim infringement, and directs the jury on
what it can and cannot do. The FCBA's model jury instruction 3.1a states
in part:
You must determine, separately for each asserted claim, whether or not
there is infringement. There is one exception to this rule. If you find that
a claim on which other claims depend is not infringed, there cannot be
infringement of any dependent claim that refers directly or indirectly to
that independent claim. On the other hand, if you find that an indepen-
dent claim has been infringed, you must still decide, separately, whether
the additional requirements of any claims that depend from the indepen-
dent claim are present in the [product or process] and thus, whether those
claims have also been infringed. A dependent claim includes all the re-
145. Callaway Golf Co., v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600. 615 n.17 (D. Del. 2008), afd in
part, rev'd in part, 576 F.3d 133 1(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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quirements of any of the claims to which it refers plus additional re-
quirements of its own. 146
This instruction tells the jury that if it finds an independent claim not in-
fringed then it cannot find any claim dependent on that claim infringed.
AIPLA's model jury instruction is less complicated, but still captures
the problem and instructs the jury to avoid the independent and dependent
problem in the context of infringement. AIPLA's model jury instruction
3.6, Infringement of Dependent Claims, states in part:
If you find that the [Independent Claim] from which [Dependent Claim]
depends is not literally infrinped, then you cannot find that [Dependent
Claim] is literally infringed.14
Unlike the FCBA and AIPLA instructions, the National Patent Jury
Instructions only discuss independent and dependent claims generally, and
do not provide specific guidance in the infringement context. NPJI's model
jury instruction 3.7 deals with infringement of dependent claims:
So far, my instructions on infringement have applied to what are known
as independent claims. The patent also contains dependent claims. Each
dependent claim refers to an independent claim. A dependent claim in-
cludes each of the requirements of the independent claim to which it re-
fers and one or more additional requirements.
In order to find infringement of dependent claim [ of the [XXX] patent,
you must first determine whether independent claim [ ] of the patent has
been infringed. If you decide that the independent claim has not been in-
fringed, then the dependent claim cannot have been infringed. If you de-
cide that the independent claim has been infringed, you must then
separately determine whether each additional requirement of the depen-
dent claim has also been included in the accused product [method]. If
each additional requirement has been included, then the dependent claim
has been infringed.148
None of the instructions, however, instruct the jury as to invalidity due
to anticipation or obviousness. Even though the FCBA and AIPLA instruc-
tions explicitly state that a dependent claim cannot be infringed unless the
independent claim on which it is based is also infringed, none of the model
jury instructions make a similar statement with regard to validity. The addi-
tion of an explicit statement regarding dependent claims in the context of
validity would address this issue. The proposed instruction states:
146. FCBA's model jury instruction 3.1a, 2009, available at
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9005/Library/purchase%20items/Jury/*20lnstr
uctions%20November/o202009.pdf.
147. AIPLA's model jury instruction 3.6. 2008, available at
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publicationsl/Publications-available-for-viewingl/2008
03_27 AIPLA Model JuryInstructions.pdf.
148. National Jury Instruction Project, Model Patent Jury Instructions 8.12 June 17, 2009 available
at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/index.php.
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A dependent claim includes all of the requirements of any of the claims
to which it refers, plus additional requirements of its own. Therefore, if
you find that an independent claim is not anticipated or nonobvious, then
you must also find that any claim that depends from it is not anticipated
or nonobvious.
To show how such an instruction would work, consider Callaway
Golf supra, in which the district court specifically pointed to the lack of
such a model jury instruction.149 In Callaway Golf, the jury returned a ver-
dict finding independent Claim 4 not obvious, but dependent Claim 5 ob-
vious. Under the proposed model jury instruction, Claim 4 was found to be
nonobvious, so the jury would be instructed to find any claim that depends
from it, Claim 5 in this case, to also be nonobvious.
In TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Atrix Laboratories, Inc., a
jury returned irreconcilable verdicts, finding independent Claim 1 to be
valid, but dependent Claim 2 to be both anticipated and obvious."'o Both
parties had agreed to the special verdict form, and the jury was instructed
as to the meaning of independent and dependent claims.' The defendants
moved for a mistrial, but the court reinstructed the jury and submitted a
new verdict form. 15 2 The new verdict form indicated that if the jury found
claim 1 invalid, then it should not render a verdict as to Claim 2.' The jury
found Claim 1 invalid, did not give a finding on Claim 2, and the court
entered the judgment.'54 On appeal, the defendants argued that the jury was
confused, and that the court erred when it did not order a new trial.' The
parties settled after briefing, but prior to the Federal Circuit ruling on the
case.'5 6 However, if the proposed jury instruction had been used, the jury
would not have returned with the original verdict, thus not needing to be
instructed a second time.
149. Callaway Golf 585 F. Supp. 2d at 615 n.17.
150. Brief of Defendant-Appellants Atrix Laboratories Inc. and Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., TAP
Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Atrix Laboratories, Inc., 218 Fed. Appx. 993 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 2006










C. Changing the Federal Circuit's Approach Under the Rule ofDefe-
rence
Finally, the Federal Circuit could chose not to defer to regional circuit
law for irreconcilable jury verdicts from independent and dependent
claims. As discussed in Section I, supra, the Federal Circuit generally de-
fers to regional circuit law for issues of procedure.'s However, the Federal
Circuit has made clear that it does not defer to regional circuit rules in all
procedural cases.' 8 "[W]hen the question on appeal is one involving subs-
tantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit . .. we apply to [sic] related
procedural issues the law of this circuit."" 9
Professor Schaffner has categorized the legal issues confronting the
Federal Circuit into five categories:
(1) Substantive issues within its exclusive jurisdiction, (2) procedural is-
sues which implicate or pertain to the substantive patent law, (3) proce-
dural matters relating to the court's own appellate jurisdiction, (4)
procedural matters not unique to the patent law, and (5) substantive is-
sues not within its exclusive jurisdiction.160
Professor Schaffner indicates that the court exercises independent
judgment for categories one through three and defers to regional circuits for
categories four and five.16 ' Therefore, the question of whose law to apply
with respect to irreconcilable independent and dependent verdicts on ap-
peal, would seem to turn on whether the issue was unique to patent law.
However, the court's application of this rule has not always led to ex-
pected results. 162 In Beverly Hills Fan Co., the Federal Circuit declined to
157. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 858.
159. Id. (quoting Chrysler Motor Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 953 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)).
160. Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit 'Choice of Law': Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81
IOWA L. REv. 1173, 1181 (1996) (internal footnotes omitted).
161. Id at 1181-82.
162. See Id. at 1186-89 (1996) (noting that "the requirement that the issue be 'unique to' the patent
laws is not always necessary for the Federal Circuit to exercise independent judgment over a procedural
issue"). This inconsistency has led to calls for reforming or abandoning the rule of deference. See e.g.
Peter J. Karol, Who's at the Helm? The Federal Circuit's Rule of Deference and the Systemic Absence
of Controlling Precedent in Matters of Patent Litigation Procedure, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 43 (2009) ("The
many factors that point against keeping the Rule of Deference clearly outweigh the limited benefits that
point in favor of maintaining it."); Adam E. Miller, The Choice of Law Rules and the Use of Precedent
in the Federal Circuit: A Unique and Evolving System, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 301, 330 (2006)
(considering a shift towards either more deference or more independent review would decrease the level
of confusion); Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 HoUS. L. REV.
779, 800 (2002) ("Perhaps the Federal Circuit should apply its own law to all procedural issues arising
in patent cases."); Schaffner, supra note 160, at 1206 ("[T]he Federal Circuit should exercise indepen-
dent judgment unless deference to regional circuit law serves a significant interest."); Sean M. McEl-
downey, Comment, The 'Essential Relationship' Spectrum: A Framework for Addressing Choice of
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defer in evaluating personal jurisdiction, an area that would not seem to be
unique to patent law.163 In Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., the
court declined to defer to the Tenth Circuit's definition of "prevailing par-
ty" and its appellate standard of review.'" In Manildra Milling, the Federal
Circuit noted that the trial court would not be burdened by having to apply
Federal Circuit law because the issue would not arise until after the com-
pletion of the trial.165
In Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., the Federal Circuit de-
termined that whether a post-verdict motion is necessary to appeal the suf-
ficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict was not subject to
regional circuit law deference.16 In coming to this conclusion, the court
determined that there would be no concern with district courts having to
apply two sets of procedural laws during trial because whether an underly-
ing factual issue can be reviewed is one that can "only arise after all the
evidence is submitted and the verdict returned," and the availability of ap-
pellate review does not affect either procedural or substantive issues during
the trial.167 In addition, the Federal Circuit had declined to defer to regional
circuit law in cases involving the issuance of preliminary injunctions,'68
whether a claim should have been previously asserted as a compulsory
counterclaim, 169 whether materials are relevant-and thus discoverable-in
patent litigation,'70 and the application of attorney-client privilege to an
invention record submitted to in-house counsel.' 7'
In contrast, the Federal Circuit deferred to regional circuit courts in
determining the pleading requirements of a pro se plaintiff in a patent suit
in McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.172 Because pleading standards were not
unique to patent law, the Federal Circuit looked to Fifth Circuit law for the
circuit's general standards and more lenient standard for pro se plaintiffs. 7 1
Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2005) (advocating a single spectrum
between substantive and procedural and applying deference consistently with respect to the spectrum).
163. Bevery Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
164. Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 1182.
166. 946 F.2d 850, 855, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
167. Id. at 859.
168. Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
169. Polymer Indus. Prod. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Although the suit involved in Polymer was a patent infringement suit, whether it was a compulsory
counterclaim would seem not to be unique to patent laws and instead to be much more related to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 13(a).
170. Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
171. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
172. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
173. Id.
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Because the Supreme Court had recently articulated pleading standards in
antitrust cases in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Federal Circuit used
an earlier case it had decided under Eleventh Circuit law, Phonometrics,
Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Systems, and concluded that the plaintiffs
sparse pleadings identifying the patent and accused patent were sufficient
for a pro se plaintiff.174 The result of the Federal Circuit using Eleventh
Circuit precedent to predict what the Fifth Circuit would do has resulted in
an inconsistent approach by district courts attempting to apply McZeal.'75
The Northern District of Georgia cited McZeal in a 2007 case for the "in-
teresting[] proposition that Eleventh Circuit law governed the issue", but
approached the issue with its own thorough analysis rather than follow the
Federal Circuit's decision.'76 However, the Eastern District of Virginia and
District of Minnesota decided to use the McZeal analysis when they found
no local controlling authority.'7 7 The minimum pleading requirements for
initiating a patent suit, an area that seems to involve very substantive fac-
tors, will be viewed by the Federal Circuit on appeal through deferring to
regional circuit law.
Any rule allowing for appellate review of irreconcilable jury verdicts
regardless of whether the party raised the issue to the district court would
function much the same way as the rules in Manildra Milling and Biodex,
in that a rule change would not interfere with the trial court's management
of the trial. Instead, the rule would only have effect after the verdict was
rendered. Much of the language the court used in coming to its decision in
Biodex for appellate review of a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence
would apply equally to allowing appellate review of an inconsistent jury
verdict:
Uniformity in the review of patent trial is enhanced, rather than hindered,
by our adoption of a single position.. .. Indeed, an opposite rule would
be confusion, as the same patent .. . might have the same dispositive fac-
tual finding reviewed or not depending upon which of differing regional
circuit laws was applicable. 78
174. Id. at 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., 203 F.3d
790 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
175. Karol, supra note 162, at 9.
176. Id. (discussing CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (N.D.
Ga. 2007).
177. Id. (discussing Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA Corp., No. Civ. 3:07 cv 543, 2007 WL 4562874
at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2007) and Schwendimann v. Arkwright, Inc., No. Civ. 08-162, 2008 WL
2901691 at *2 (D. Minn. July 23, 2008).
178. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1991). To the extent
that anticipation is considered a factual question, a party with an irreconcilable verdict could attempt to
argue that the evidence was insufficient-and indeed could never be sufficient-to uphold such a
verdict. In light of the Federal Circuit's application of the Sixth Circuit's waiver rule, however, a party
is unlikely to win this argument at the current time.
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However, even the adoption of a more modest proposal that the mo-
tion could be made as a post-trial motion would advance the goal of elimi-
nating irreconcilable verdicts.' The finding of fact, either the invalidity or
infringement of an independent claim and related dependent claim, has a
substantial relationship to patent law. Dependent claims only exist because
they are specifically allowed in 35 U.S.C. § 112, a vital component of the
Patent Act. The same uniformity concerns that prompted the Manildra
Milling and Biodex courts to decline deference to regional circuit rules
seems at least as strong in issues of logical invalidity or infringement. The
availability of such review would not change any procedural or substantive
rule up until the point the jury returns with the verdict. Additionally, the
fairness concerns with requiring counsel to recognize an indepen-
dent/dependent inconsistency within a time as short as six minutes seem
valid."so
Concern that setting out special procedural requirements for patent lit-
igation would cause problems in the administration of such trials by district
courts is over-estimated. First, consider that many districts have established
local patent rules or individual rules specific to patent litigation, and most
patent litigation practitioners tend to practice nationally."' Second, the
Federal Circuit's decisions, discussed supra, about what procedural rules
are essentially related to substantive patent law also indicate that district
courts are already dealing with these issues.
Should the Federal Circuit establish such a rule, there would be con-
cern that a party might intentionally fail to object to an irreconcilable ver-
dict in order to force a second trial and hope for a more favorable result.
However, the burden to point out the irreconcilable nature of the verdict
would fall on the opposing party to point out the problem to the court. A
party presented with irreconcilable verdicts may not wish to give the jury a
second chance for fear that the jury may return a less favorable result.
However, the adoption of the model jury instruction, as proposed above,
would serve to alert both parties and the court of the possibility of such
conflicts.
179. See Arachnid, Inc. v. sMedalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
180. See L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
181. Karol, supra note 162, at 29 n.142 (discussing a number of districts having adopted such rules,
including the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of Texas, and others, such as the




Despite clear rules from the Federal Circuit regarding the validity and
infringement relationships of independent and dependent claims, juries
have returned irreconcilable verdicts. In some cases, these have been cor-
rected either by the trial court or the Federal Circuit on appeal. However,
because of the way in which the Federal Circuit has applied its rule of defe-
rence, regional circuit rules have allowed these irreconcilable verdicts to
stand.
Three solutions are proposed in an attempt to solve these problems.
First, the district courts should regularly use special and general interroga-
tories to allow for the opportunity to correct any irreconcilable jury ver-
dicts. Second, the adoption of a more explicit jury instruction with regard
to invalidity of independent and dependent claims would help to guide the
jury to consistent verdicts, as well as alert the court and parties to the exis-
tence of a potential problem immediately when the verdicts were returned.
Finally, the Federal Circuit should modify its rule of deference to consider
irreconcilable verdicts of independent and dependent claims under its own
independent analysis. An approach allowing for appellate review regardless
of post-verdict motions is advocated, although a more modest position of
requiring a post-verdict motion would promote many of the goals.
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